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INTRODUCTION
To be a new coming Democrat candidate in 2016 could have been considered a
guaranteed loss, when looking back on it now. We saw Congress become Republican controlled,
behind a “red wave” of sorts, led by Presidential candidate Donald Trump. Trump seemed to be a
heroic figure for a collected group of middle class America, what he referred to as the “silent
majority”. Trump inspired those with far-right winged political agendas to stand up for what
they considered to be theirs, and the results of the 2016 election seemed to speak for themselves.
Donald Trump had defied all odds in becoming the Forty-Fifth President of the United States,
defeating many a lifelong politician to earn his spot at the desk of the most powerful man in the
world. From being laughed about to being President, Donald Trump seemed to spark a revolution
for Republicans. Where Democrats had previously taken hold of the Executive, and Legislative
branches post-George W. Bush, the Republican Party had been searching for a voice to lead
them back into power. Clearly, Trump was able to get the votes he was searching for, and there
seemed to be no better time to be a Republican incumbent. Clearly, with a massive swing to the
right, seen through the retaking of the House and Senate by Republicans in 2016, there really
shouldn’t be many Republicans losing their districts, especially in districts won by Trump.
However, in this time of Republican election domination, there is one particular conservative
who not only lost his district, but lost to a Hillary Clinton- backed candidate.1 This Congressman,
Scott Garrett, represented New Jersey’s Fifth Congressional District, which had been the

1

“What Happened to Scott Garrett?” n.d. Accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.rollcall.com/politics/gottheimersays-garrett-wont-talk-transition.
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incumbent for the past fourteen years. In an election where Republicans took both the House and
the Senate, and won the Presidential, how could a Republican lose in a district that voted for
Trump?
New Jersey’s Fifth Congressional district is located in Northern New Jersey, relatively
close to New York City. The district includes four counties (Bergen, Passaic, Sussex, and
Warren) and 79 municipalities. It has become more urban, due to the proximity to New York
City. With a population of 746,385, the largest age distribution is found in the 45-54 year old
bracket, with over 117,000. The median age of the district is 42.6, and 579,702 is over 18. The
district isn’t overwhelmingly diverse, with 89.3% of people being white. The district does pretty
well economically, which could be attested to the proximity to NYC, with a 4.2%
unemployment. The mean household income was $134,359. The district is pretty well educated,
with a 93.7% high school graduation rate, and 48.2 % of residents hold a bachelor's degree or
higher. 2What is important about these figures, is that they all go along with trends of the
Republican Party. According to debt.org’s study of the economic demographic of Republicans
and Conservatives, Republican districts tend to be suburban areas where older, well educated,
upper-middle to upper class citizens live. This shows us that the district seems to be a good place
for a conservative Republican, such as Garrett to thrive, which he does for fourteen years, until
his eventual defeat in 2016.3

2

Center for New Media & Promotion (CNMP), US Census Bureau. n.d. “My Congressional District.” Accessed
April 30, 2019. https://www.census.gov/mycd/?st=34&cd=05.

3

“Economic Demographics of Republicans &amp; Conservatives.” n.d. Accessed April 30, 2019.
https://www.debt.org/faqs/americans-in-debt/economic-demographics-republicans/.
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The election of 2016 was between incumbent Republican representative Scott Garrett,
who was first voted into office in 2002, Libertarian Claudio Belusic, and Democratic challenger
Josh Gottheimer. Gottheimer, a UPenn and Harvard Law graduate, had a solid history in working
inside politics. He was part of Bill Clinton’s 1996 reelection campaign, on the “rapid response
team”. He later went on to work in the Clinton administration as a speechwriter, until the
administrations end in 2001. While in Law school, Gottheimer worked for Wesley Clark, and
later on John Kerry’s 2004 Presidential campaigns. After that, he worked on Hillary Clinton’s
2008 campaign as well, and kept close ties with the Clinton’s.4 After announcing his campaign
for Congress in 2015, many Clinton backers were very open to his candidacy, and able to back
him. The New York Times referred to him as a protégé to the Clintons5, and according to his
campaign finance filings in 2015, which was about one million dollars by the end of September
of that year, about one in six dollars raised was from a fellow Clinton White house or campaign
alumni.6 Some of the major donors included three of Clinton’s former Press Secretaries, and two
former chiefs of staff. While the backing from the Clinton network, and Gottheimer’s political
history seem to be great accolades and experience to win a district, the district was still
Republican, and had been that way for thirteen years. The challenges ahead of Gottheimer were
great, and to win the district would be monumental for not only himself, but the entire party as a
whole.

4

“Biography | U.S. Representative Josh Gottheimer.”. https://gottheimer.house.gov/biography/.

5

“Protégé of Clintons Targets U.S. Congressional Seat - The New York
Timeshttps://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/26/nyregion/protege-of-hillary-and-bill-clintons-targets-uscongressional-seat.html.

6NJ

Advance Media. “Former Clinton Aide Raises Big Money for Potential N.J. Congressional Run | The Auditor.”
NJ.com, NJ.com, 9 July 2015,
www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/07/former_clinton_aide_raises_big_money_for_potential.html.
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While Gottheimer’s success in the district is also interesting to look at, especially in a
year where Republicans took Congress back, in many ways, Scott Garrett will be the focus of
this project. Scott Garrett, a long term Republican, rose to power in a way that seems almost
perfect. After winning elections in 2006 and 2008, both years where Republicans do poorly,
which seemed to be due to the downward trend of President Bush’s popularity. This seemed to
establish power for Garrett, as Democrats, after trying to take over his seat in 2008 with more
financial effort than 2006, gave up in supporting candidates in the district. Garrett seems to be
doing extremely well for himself, as he moved into a higher level of Congressional power,
gaining a seat on the Financial Services Committee within Congress, and even heading a
subcommittee7. This gain in power has effect on how much financial gain Garrett receives from
outside sources, since his committee directly dealt with Wall Street. However, Garrett is severely
affected by the 2010 census redistricting, and other trends that suggest that he lost his district
over the course of his incumbency. Garrett remains a firm conservative throughout his time in
office, and after the redistricting of 2012 brought a new wave of Democratic voters to his district,
it seemed that Garrett needed to either change his views, in order to appeal to his new members
of his district, or go back to his base, and try to get as much support as possible. The problem
with this was that when Garrett began to gain more power within Congress, he started to neglect
his base, and lost a touch with his ever-changing district. There were multiple “bad votes”, that
seemed to enrage his district, which can be shown by what seemed to be a drop in Republican
turnout in the district, and these votes were continuously exploited by Gottheimer, leading to

7

“The Voter’s Self Defense System.” n.d. https://votesmart.org/candidate/biography/4430/scottgarrett#.XMiG_zbYrnE.
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what appears to be a mobilization of Democrats, especially heading into 2016. Along with this,
anti-gay comments by Garrett seemed to be the final blow that ended up sinking his campaign.
8

As a district that is moving in a more progressive direction, the publication of these comments

did not bode well for the conservative, especially when large sums of money were being aimed
to tarnish his name. It seems that these factors, which arose due to Garrett’s prior success, lead to
his eventual downfall in 2016.
This project will focus on the Congressional career path of Scott Garrett, and how
decisions and actions he makes and takes, along with those around him, throughout his time in
office, seem to end up taking what was looking like a very long Congressional career, and
turning it into an eventual loss in a campaign that, due to trends across the nation, Garrett should
not have lost. I will look at Garrett’s time in Congress very closely, and look to find where he
went wrong, and how the decisions he makes in office led to his downfall. I will look to compare
these strategies used by Garrett, along with the mistakes he makes, with the ideas of scholars of
American politics. I will give the district a close, analysis, examining trends that suggest that the
supposed mistakes Garrett makes have an effect upon his political support in the district. I will
show that Scott Garrett’s grand rise to power was mirrored by a dramatic decline, as a result of a
negligence of the constituency that fueled his rise. When his base needed to change after 2012,
Garrett seemed to refuse to change, and this ended up losing touch with his district. This gave the
Democrats the opportunity to take control of the district, through a campaign portraying Garrett
as a man whose values no longer reflected those of New Jersey’s Fifth Congressional district.

8

“New Jersey Rep. Scott Garrett’s Anti-Gay Comments Could Hurt His Reelection Bid : NPR.”
https://www.npr.org/2016/10/29/499878652/anti-gay-remarks-lost-a-congressman-wall-street-and-maybe-hishouse-seat.
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This project is not about a single campaign, but rather the rise and fall of a long term incumbent,
in an ever changing political climate, and how small mistakes in political navigation can lead to a
loss of power.
This project shows that no politician is safe, no matter how they rise to power. Garrett
was a representative who was seemingly untouchable for the vast majority of his years in office.
However, this is clearly not the case. This project will cover important topics in Congressional
politics, such as redistricting, developing power via a base at home and elsewhere, the
importance of campaign finance, the idea of perception, both in the sense of how a constituency
views an incumbent, and perhaps, more importantly, how an incumbent views their district, and
their constituency. Garrett is a very interesting case to look at when examining all of these
previous topics. Garrett, being of similar political affiliation with that of Donald Trump, clearly
must have angered his base, and his district as a whole, since they voted for Trump over Clinton,
yet elected a Clinton-backed Democrat over an incumbent whose ideas mirror that of Trump.
Being able to identify these issues that make candidates vulnerable, even in favorable years,
through a case such as Garrett’s, can help candidates decide if it is a reasonable decision to run
or not. Being able to identify a candidate who is losing their base is vital for political parties. The
goal of this project will be to not only study an important case where an incumbent lost his
district when many things, such as national trends, suggest he shouldn’t, but also to draw from it
a broader understanding of an incumbent’s relationship with his or her district.
Overall, what is so interesting about this case is that Garrett’s loss appears to happen out
of nowhere. One moment Garrett is stable, and safe in a district he has a firm hold on; in the
next, he is looking for a new job after being replaced by a newcomer. Politicians need to be
extremely careful of the actions they take, and how those will affect not only their power in

14

Congress, but more importantly, how their district looks at them. This is where I believe
Garrett’s biggest flaw arose, as he did not consistently change with the political tides of the
country and his district. He remains stubbornly in his political ways, and when variables around
him change, he does not change to fit those new conditions. With social media, and other sources
of instant news at our fingertips, politics has changed remarkably from an era of daily
newspapers and nightly news broadcasts. When a Congressman or woman makes a mistake that
affects their district, the district will know about it almost instantly. While a strong incumbent
with a good base is able to explain their mistakes to their constituents, it becomes much harder
when a well- funded opponent, such as Gottheimer, has the means to ensure that the mistake
doesn’t go away. Garrett, regarded as probably the most conservative representative in the entire
North East United States, seemed to not adjust with the times, and the changes in his district. His
district noticed it, Democrats noticed it, and it ends up leading to a premature downfall on what
could have been a long political career, when, in a time of Republican control of government, he
could have advanced his career significantly further.

15
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
Scott Garrett seems to follow an interesting path during his Congressional career. He
does so many things right early on in his career, that it seems almost too good to be true. It turns
out to be the case for Garrett, as it seems his downfall can be attributed to many small factors
that seem to slowly add up into a large factor, and result in Josh Gottheimer sweeping the district
from right under his feet. How does a candidate who has risen to power so gracefully, fall so
rapidly? In order to answer this question, we must begin with how scholars in the field would
respond to it. When looking at how to develop and maintain a long congressional career, it seems
that there are four main requirements: (1) developing a base, (2) power in Congress, (3)
maintaining a good public image, and (4) acquiring substantial and consistent campaign funding.
These requirements are in chronological order, based on the arc of a Member of Congress’
career. While these requirements are normally achieved in this order, once all four are achieved,
a loss of any requirement will lead to a potential downfall of a Member of Congress, which could
happen in different orders. In this chapter, I will go through each of these four requirements, in
order, and explain their importance to the rise in power for Members of Congress, and how a loss
of each could lead to downfall.
I: Establishing a Base
When speaking of incumbents, the first objective when trying to develop power is
establishing a base. What is so important about establishing a base is that with a solid grouping
of support at home, it makes it hard to be beaten in an election. According to Fenno, elected

17

officials have three main goals, and the first is re-election.9 Without re-election, nothing else
really matters if the candidate is re-elected. Re-election comes hand in hand with developing a
solid relationship with your constituency. So, it is common for elected officials to try to go out
and campaign unofficially while they are in office. Rallies, town hall sessions, and social media
presence, seem to be ways that politicians today go about this. Name recognition is key for an
incumbent in an election cycle, so being able to always be a known voice in the district you
represent is vital.
Fenno describes his “home-style” approach to politics, which basically is how an
incumbent operates regarding their specific home district.10 This home-style approach to politics
falls in line with the three goals of Congressional incumbents. To have a home style approach to
politics is to work through a strong relationship with the district. One of the most important
aspects of this is the trust of the district. With trust, questionable votes can be explained easier,
and politicians have room to work with regarding policy, and garnering power within
Congress.11 Being active in the district, by hosting town halls, being at fundraisers and local
events, and being personable, always looking to greet constituents, and never being afraid of
tough questions, are things that Congressmen and women should do, in order to build a level of
trust with those who live in their district. Developing a strong relationship is obviously
important, especially in the early stages of a tenure.12 In order to develop this relationship,
according to Fenno, incumbents group their constituencies into four subgroups. First, is the
geographical constituency,13 which is the broadest grouping. This group is the largest of the four

9

Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Longman Classics Series). Upper Saddle River:
Pearson, 1978. Pg. 31
10
Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Longman Classics Series). Upper Saddle
River: Pearson, 1978.pg 31
11
Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Pg. 136
12
Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg. 177
13 13
Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg. 1
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groups, and contains the entire district and all voters within the district. Second, is called the
reelection constituency, 14which consists of the members of the district who are going to vote for
you. Third, is called the Primary Constituency,15 which includes those who will not only vote for
you but will work on the campaign. Finally, is the Personal Constituency, 16which consists of
family, friends, etc. By grouping the total constituency, the candidate can look at their district in
different ways. For example, by understanding those who will and won’t vote for you, the
candidate can put more or less work into certain things such as campaign strategies. Something
major to think about regarding home style approaches is that they need to be maintained, and be
consistent. By being inconsistent, incumbents are at risk of losing trust in their district, and
looking vulnerable to challengers17.
The initial approach of an incumbent is more of a trust building stage, called the
expansionist stage.18 This stage is where the incumbent builds on his following, and creating the
framework of a solid following within their constituency. This where the incumbent will take try
to use the title to his or her advantage.19 Jacobson talks about the incumbency advantage as a tool
used by those running for reelection. Certain advantages of the incumbency advantage include,
free trips around the district, having a large staff, being able to actively serve the community
while still running for reelection, and what is most important when looking for reelection, name
recognition. 20Once reelected multiple times, Congressmen and women seem to look ahead, as
their power within their own districts has been established. By winning a district over multiple

14 14

Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg. 8
Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg. 18
16
Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg. 24
17
Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg. 158
18
Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg.176
19
Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. The Politics of Congressional Elections. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
2016. Pg. 39
20
Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. The Politics of Congressional Elections pg. 48
15 15

19

times, opposing parties will stop trying to run against a strong incumbent, since the money
required to beat a strong incumbent will be potentially useless spending.21 Jacobson states that
$500,000 of campaign funds will just give a challenger a ten percent chance to win an election.
22

Theoretically, a challenger will need to go into the millions in order to beat a strong incumbent,

which without party backing, is extremely hard to do.
When opposing parties back away from challenging incumbents, the district becomes
safe for the incumbent. This means that there is no direct threat of losing the district, since the
previous victories by said incumbent, deter strong opponents from wasting their time and money
in trying to defeat someone who has proven themselves to be difficult to be defeated. This
comfortability in one’s district allows a representative to move on from this initial stage of
developing a base, and move on to acquire a larger source of power in D.C.
II: Congressional Power
After developing a strong base within one’s district, the second stage of a Member of Congress’
career is developing power in Congress. Once elected officials win re-election, and develop a
strong working relationship with their district, the next step is gain power within Congress,
which mostly comes from party allegiance. Becoming a major player in Congress involves
seemingly “selling out” at times, which means that the elected official will often vote on party
lines on most, if not all, votes they cast.23 By pledging their allegiance to the party they
represent, Congressmen and women are often rewarded with seats on important committees
within Congress. These seats on these committees tends to lead to these officials receiving
campaign money from outside sources, such as NGOs looking to gain influence over committee

21 21

Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. The Politics of Congressional Elections pg. 53
Jacobson, Gary C., and Jamie L. Carson. The Politics of Congressional Elections pg. 63
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Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg. 215
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members. The attractiveness of this outside money is extreme, as money is also severely
important to consistently winning re-election. The excess campaign funds, plus added name
recognition from being a major name within the party, seems to be a path to a long political
career. Once an incumbent firmly controls his or her district, they tend to move on to working
more in DC. This phase is referred to as the protectionist phase, which is when incumbents still
try to keep good relations with their district, but are more focused on maintaining and less on
building at home, while looking to acquire more power in Congress. 24
Mayhew draws upon Fenno’s home style approach, and elaborates a theory of party
loyalty as not necessarily a way to get elected and stay elected, especially in Congress. He speaks
about the importance of parties in other countries election systems, and emphasizes a comparison
with the party system in the United Kingdom. In the U.K., the idea of team ship is viewed as
essential. The nomination system in the U.K. is controlled by parties, which means when they
are looking for candidates, they are more than likely going to choose those who are on party lines
with their votes. While the party does not directly endorse these nominations, the nomination
groups at the local levels act as “cheerleaders” of sort, and do the parties bidding for them. Along
with this, the parties have way more control than the people. Parties control television air time,
which is crucial for candidates to get their voice across. While this television air time primarily is
used to promote the party itself, being associated with a party in good standing with the people is
an automatic advantage over opponents. This practically gives parties all the power they need to
control who gets into office. Candidates for Parliament are more than likely to go along with
party lines, since without it, their influence dries up.25 In the United States, things are relatively
different. Mayhew argues that party loyalty, while still important at times, will not affect

24
25

Fenno, Richard F. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts pg.176
Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. Pgs. 20-27
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whether or not someone can get into office. While certain parties can be popular in certain
elections, as we see with voter swings, it is mostly affected by how the President is perceived. If
the President is in good standing with the people, his or her party will more than likely be
rewarded in an upcoming election with maintaining previously won seats, and winning new
seats. If they are not looked at in good light, their party will more than likely lose seats. What is
different about nominations in the United States is that they are done by primaries, which gives
the party no real choice in who they want to represent them. The people get to choose which
candidate will represent the party in the election. This gives an individual way more power over
their own destiny in politics. They can spend what they want, via fundraising and other sources,
and can use these funds to make themselves known to the district. Mayhew quotes a former
Congressman who states “If we depended on party organization to get elected, none of us would
be here.”26 This idea, stemming from the 1970’s seems to be slightly outdated, as party politics
have reemerged, and trends of polarization have been found in recent politics. In Congress, an
individual is freer to represent their district how they deem fit, and how the district wants them
to, but there are still benefits from being loyal to one’s party. While Mayhew’s example of the
difference between party loyalty in the U.K. and the United States shows a clear difference on
the surface, newer trends of party polarization have shown that there is a definitely underlying
similarity between the two. While party loyalty prior to initial election is not mandatory, to
maintain one’s status as a representative it seems Congressmen and women often stay near party
lines. The supposed benefit of party loyalty equals a rise in power in D.C, which would in return
allow an incumbent to maintain power at home.

26

Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. Pg. 27
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While we understand why party loyalty, which leads to growth in power in Congress,
may lead to maintaining power at home, what does power in Congress mean, and what are the
benefits? Mayhew discusses the expected incumbent differential.27 This is any difference that
can be perceived by any relevant political actor between what they believe an incumbent can do
in office, compared to that of the challenger. These political actors can be from anywhere, as the
money can come from anywhere. So, if big organizations that back an incumbent realize that the
challenger better represents them and what they are for, they will pull the money from the
incumbent and put that money into the challenger. This leads into Mayhew’s theory of a Dual
Constituency.28 The idea that money can come from anywhere is very important to incumbents,
especially as they start to slip into more of a protectionist stage. As they begin to gain power in
DC, incumbents will begin to look at two different types of constituencies, those who are at
home, and those who are not. More than likely, those who are not at home are who give the most
money to incumbents. Many organizations and PACs give money to Congressional candidates
who best represent them. However, those who have more power in Congress obviously become
more important to them, as committee members tends to have a larger say on what goes in
certain bills. Also having the support of a major name in DC is always a goal of organizations
and PAC’s as their main goal is to get legislation passed that benefits them. So, all the incumbent
has to do to receive large campaign donations, is to vote for legislature than benefits those who
are paying him/her. So, for example, a pro second amendment based PAC is going to give their
most money to those who vote for gun rights. The more an incumbent votes along party lines, or
to appease big money, the more careful they must be. As time goes on, and the more they work
away from home, the more candidates can lose touch with their districts. This can result from
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“bad votes”, or bad publicity. In an age of social media, one scandal that involves social issues
can ruin a career. So, in order to maintain power, an incumbent must tread lightly, and be able to
explain any mistakes they may make, and make sure not to make any statements or “bad votes”
that lead to a falling out within their district.

III: Public Perception
Fenno’s third incumbent objective, is good public perception. 29This brings back the idea
of a good working relationship with the district. In order to stay in good standing with your
district, you must still make your voters happy with the way you vote. While one bad vote may
not kill a politician’s career, a string of bad votes will put an elected official in the “dog house”
so to speak. In order for a good relationship to continue, an elected official needs to be able to
explain their votes to their district, and to get them either on board with the vote, or to understand
why they did it. This bring back Fenno’s home-style approach. Being able to understand what
votes your district will respond correctly to is vital when trying to maintain a good image at
home.
Mayhew argues that Congressional seats are not as safe as they seem. Mayhew states that
seats in Congress are never really guarantees, and Congressional elects must do everything in
their power to stay in office, even if that means crossing party lines. While party politics can
come into play when looking to expand power in DC, the most important thing is still keeping
your base at home. He states that an incumbent’s position should remain conservative, in regards
to voting along district lines. He says, “Probably the best position taking strategy for most
congressmen at most times is to be conservative- to cling to their own positions of the past where
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possible, and reach for new ones with great caution when necessary.” 30 However, it is always
important to look on the national scale, and have an understanding of how popular vote is
changing, in order to adapt. So, if a Democratic President is looked at poorly in the eyes of
voters, it would be wise for a Democratic Representative to, at times, vote against unpopular
bills.31 The President can make or break many Congressional careers. Those who continuously
back an unpopular President in a marginal, or competitive, district, may see themselves losing
their seats over trying to stay within party lines. The reverse is also true: if a President from a
Congressional representative’s opposing party is extremely popular, and is viewed in great
standing by the nation, it can be wise for that representative to start voting along with him or her,
in order to show that they are backing the popular side. Now, this may affect future power being
acquired in Congress, since crossing party lines can definitely hurt a representative’s relationship
with their party. However, being able to understand one’s district, and knowing how to balance a
relationship with their district and party loyalty is what makes maintaining power in Congress
and at home a constant struggle. Those who are able to balance these relationships tend to have
long congressional careers. 32
According to Mayhew, it seems that voters tend to really have no idea what incumbents
actually do, as long as they are not controversial. 33What is a generation of technology, where
news is at our fingertips constantly, voters tend to still be out of touch with what is actually
going on in D.C. So, the importance of public image is massive. Mayhew states that incumbents
need to not worry about the average voter, those who stay relatively informed about major
issues, but not so informed that they know every vote their representative makes, but rather those
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who have influence in politics. Having good standing with major organizations that deal with
important issues of the district is key to being able to maintain a good public image. Persuasive
endorsements also make for good publicity for incumbents. Having endorsements from police
forces, labor unions, teacher unions, and other major DC names will give an incumbent a more
solid grasp on their constituencies.34 For example, if a wildly popular President or Vice President
endorses a candidate, they are more likely to get elected, since the casual voter sees that the
President or Vice President who they love supports them. With this being said, advertising is also
vital. Being able to put yourself out to your constituencies as much as possible makes it easier for
those who do not follow politics closely to become familiar with politicians. On the other hand,
attack ads can kill a campaign. Sometimes expanding on the truth, the goal of attack ads are
exactly the opposite of what positive ads are for. Attack ads are used mostly to blast a candidate,
and to try to make casual voters associate them with bad things. This ties back into the idea of
“bad votes” and potential scandals. So for example, if an incumbent has a history of voting for
pro-life legislature, but a challenger finds out they previously had an abortion, attack ads will
pose them as a hypocrite liar. Some organizations or opposing candidates have gone so far as to
approach candidate’s siblings for testimony on why they will not be voting for their brother or
sister. In today’s age of social media, ads can be almost constantly around you, whether or not
your notice them. By constantly trying to implant an image of a candidate in your head,
organizations and opposing candidates will stop at nothing to try to tarnish the name of an
incumbent, in order to steal their seat for themselves. So, being able to stay away from bad votes
and scandal becomes even more important for any incumbent, especially those in a protectionist
phase.
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IV: Campaign Funding
What goes directly along with advertising is money. Money seems to be where elections
are won, no matter how good the incumbent’s relationship is with their district. More likely than
not, those who spend more, will win an election. Money can equal influence, so the more money
put into an election, the more influence that candidate has over the constituency. Jacobson states
that money is more important to challengers, rather than incumbents, since they need to get the
word out. 35This does not mean that an incumbent can just coast through an election, since if they
are massively outspent, a challenger can even the playing field. The question then comes, if
massive amounts of money are needed to win an election over a strong incumbent, why do
challengers even run? Jacobson states that maybe it is because they are naive, however it is more
than likely that is not the case. What is more than likely is that if the incumbent was weaker,
there would be more qualified politicians looking to take the seat away from them. So, even by
losing an election to an incumbent, it may give these challengers better name recognition down
the road, when they are more experienced and qualified.36 On the other hand, a good challenger
can make a long term incumbent look weak. If a no name challenger comes into an election, and
gives a long term incumbent a run for his or her money, that can really harm an incumbent’s
appearance not only to his or her constituency, but to the opposing party as well. If the
opposition sees that there was a slight weakness, they will attack that seat in the next election
cycle with higher profile names and more money. Any time an incumbent looks vulnerable,
whether it is due to a tough string of bad votes that negatively affect his or her image in the
district, or a hard fought election that didn’t necessarily need to be difficult, the opposing party
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will look to see if they can steal a seat.37 Along with this, as quickly as big money comes into an
incumbent’s life, it can be taken away. PAC’s and NGO’s do not care whether or not a certain
politician is in office unless if positively affects them. By giving money to an incumbent who
has wrapped themselves up in scandal, it puts negative light on organizations who funded him or
her. While Ferguson’s investment theory of political donations speaks on the idea that having
access to the office alone being all that PAC’s and NGO’s want,38 if someone who is more likely
to vote for a cause these organizations are passionate about, without bringing they will fund them
against the incumbent. So, if a Congressman or woman is found to have said something
damaging of character in their past, you will see the money they received from many
organizations start to dry up. As long as the NGO’s and PAC’s get what they want out of
legislation, they do not care who is in office.39
V: Conclusion:
To conclude, the when looking to have a long term Congressional career, one must (1)
develop a base at home, (2) develop power in Congress, (3) maintain a good public image, and
(4) securing a consistent stream of campaign donations. The first means that a representative
needs to build trust with their district and develop a solid base in that district in order to keep
strong challengers away. By consistently winning, and winning by solid margins, incumbents
won’t be challenged. Developing power in Congress can be achieved by by following party
lines, and hopefully getting appointed to committees, or other larger positions within Congress
This might mean that large organizations will want to finance their campaign. This is helpful,
since a Dual Constituency provides enough financial stability to fight off any potential
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challengers looking to come in with decent backing. Maintaining a good public image is vital,
especially when looking at a Dual Constituency approach, since the incumbent must be able to
explain certain votes, especially when they are more based on party loyalty, rather than loyalty to
the district. Along with this, in the age of social media, it is vital for Congressmen and women to
be aware of everything they say or do, since not only does it affect how your district views you,
but how those who give outside money view them. Finally, establishing a solid cash flow, that
can remain consistent throughout their time in office, will make it nearly impossible for someone
to challenge them. This stems back to the idea of maintaining good public image, along with
gaining power in Congress. Without power in Congress, and a maintained, solid, public image, it
makes it difficult for outside money to want to support certain Congressmen or women. For a
long congressional career, each of these four requirements must be met. If one falters, they all
will falter. Whether big money stops supporting a candidate for regrettable comments leads to
strong challengers pushing for one’s seat, or losing their base at home over consistent bad votes,
trying to appeal to their specific political party, once a representative has achieved all four of
these requirements, they must be able to maintain them all, or watch as their congressional career
falls apart right in front of them.
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CHAPTER 2: THE RISE AND FALL OF SCOTT GARRETT
What can be inferred from the previous readings, when referring to Scott Garrett’s loss?
What I will now propose is that Garrett does all the right things in his career early on to have a
long congressional career. He follows the path that Fenno lays out for Congressional success,
and it seems to pay off for him, as after three straight victories, Garrett is a strong incumbent,
who has moved to a Dual Constituency approach, as discussed by Mayhew, where big money
continues to give Garrett more power. However, after the 2010 census redistricting, which shifts
more and more Democrats into his district, Garrett begins to feel some pressure. It seems that
Garrett has lost part of his base, when concerning himself with a Dual Constituency. Whether
because they believed he was a sure victor, or that he has fallen out of touch with the district, his
numbers begin to dip. At the same time, since he was so wrapped up in power in D.C, Garrett
failed to establish a relationship with the new members of his district, which would end up being
vital in 2016. This weakness begins to rear its head in 2014, when Garrett is challenged for the
first time by an opponent with more than meagre financial backing. During this period, Garrett
casts some questionable votes in Congress, which makes his district, which is no longer as
Republican as it once was, enraged. Along with that, Garrett makes a statement on LGBTQ
rights that could be considered completely out of touch, and he gets destroyed by it in the media.
Since Garrett went for a Dual Constituency approach, he was reliant on the big business that
gave him so much support previously to ensure he won again. However, these missteps caused a
lot of damage on that front, and big organizations begin to pull their support as well, and Garrett
is left to lose this race. This section will cover the story of how Garrett’s rise to Congressional
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power was almost a textbook story of the previous literature covered in chapter one, but as his
district was changing around him, he made certain mistakes that made him vulnerable, and
resulted in Democratic pressure, leading to his surprise defeat in 2016.
I: Garrett’s Rise to Power
Scott Garrett seems to follow a very similar approach to his early career in politics as the
one mapped out by Fenno. After Garrett’s first victory, which secured him his seat in Congress,
his goal for his next two reelection cycles seemed to be primarily to fend off Democratic
pressure to win back the seat. In 2006, when Garrett was seeking his first reelection, President
Bush was not very popular among Americans.40 This election saw the Democrats simultaneously
take over the House and Senate for the first time in twelve years.41 This would be a challenging
election for Garrett, considering his incumbency was not as established as other representatives,
but he won. In 2008, Garrett believed that the election would be a challenge for him, due to the
emergence of strong Democratic Presidential candidate in Barack Obama.42 The DCCC, or the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee even valued Garrett’s opponent Dennis
Schulman as a priority candidate in their Red to Blue campaign, viewing Garrett as vulnerable,
and at risk of losing his seat43. However, this prioritization was made too late, as it did not end up
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adding any significant value to Schulman’s campaign financially, only garnering $83,000 of
campaign funds for Schulman, in a race where Garrett was beating Schulman in campaign funds
by a ratio of over 2:1.44 In the end, Garrett won this election by 15% of the vote, winning with
57% compared to Schulman’s 42%. In an article posted by NJ.com45, Garrett claims to have even
been surprised with how well he did in the election. What is important about winning the 2008
election is that Garrett has now survived a vicious midterm cycle for Republicans, along with
another race where not only a strong Democratic leader wins the Presidential, but the DCCC
viewed him as vulnerable. By winning in 2008 by a larger margin than expected, Garrett proved
himself to be a powerful incumbent, and as such Democrats would be dissuaded from
challenging him after he won supposedly close elections by double digits three times. This helps
him massively when speaking of moving towards power in D.C., such as Mayhew suggests.
What is important is that while Bush was still in office, Garrett was appointed onto the Financial
Services Committee within Congress, which oversaw the entire financial service industry. What
is important to understand is that not only does this mean that Garrett has established himself as
a powerful member of Congress, who is being rewarded for his service, but that he now has the
attention of Wall Street, since his say on policies and regulations now directly affect how Wall
Street does business. This fits into Mayhew’s idea of a Dual Constituency, where once power is
established, the incumbent moves away from establishing a base within his own district, to
looking to establish power in Congress, which leads to big money from big organizations. This
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proves to be a factor in the 2008 election, as Schulman views it as corrupt, and a reason Garrett
should be voted out of office. He states, "This election was all about the corruption that pervades
Washington," Shulman said. "A Washington where Garrett and others take thousands of dollars
from industries they are charged to oversee. There's something really wrong about that. We lost
the election but we were right. We were right to call Garrett out on that." 46There was a reason
why raising money was so easy for Garrett, and it seems to be that he had Wall Street in his back
pocket, so to speak. Having access to this sort of money at any time, while not really worrying
about any challenge from the Democratic Party, seemed to indicate that Garrett had the potential
for a long career in Congress, unless something drastic were to happen.

II: Underlying Issues Surrounding Garrett
Where Scott Garrett’s vulnerability is initially shown is directly after the 2012
redistricting based on the 2010 census. The way the redistricting process in New Jersey works,
is that there is a redistricting commission, made up of thirteen members, consisting of six
Democrats, six Republicans, and a final member chosen by the states Supreme Court.47 In 2012
this thirteenth member, who held the deciding vote, was in fact a Republican. Despite this, Scott
Garrett’s district was changed to lean more Democratic by adding parts of New Jersey’s ninth
congressional district. There were no members of the committee from Bergen County, which is
the largest in the state. The reasoning behind the change seems to have been to pit the
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Democratic representatives from the 8th and 9th districts against each other, by changing both of
their districts maps substantially, causing both of them to run in the same district in the primary,
and opening up a chance for Republicans to take over the other district.48 This strategy worked in
the short term for the Republican Party, as in 2012 the state ended up even with six Democratic
and six Republican representatives each.49 The transfer of so many Democratic voters to
Garrett’s fifth congressional district seems to have been on the basis that he was a safe
incumbent. However, in the long term, this ends up hurting Garrett. After not being substantially
challenged in 2010, and establishing a powerful reputation in Congress and his own district,
Garrett seemed untouchable by Democrats. So, it seems that Republicans were shifting
Democrats into the fifth, in the belief that it would be extremely difficult to defeat Garrett, even
in a district that was becoming a more balanced district.
What seems to not be accounted for by the commission is that while Garrett has a solid
stronghold on his district, this was primarily due to the fact that the district was Republican in
make-up prior to the change, and by a large margin.50 Scott Garrett had never had to go across
the aisle and try to appeal to Democratic voters, since he could win without their vote. A man
who was a known conservative would need to now find a way to not only continue to appeal to
the Republicans in the district, but win over a new Democratic faction in the district.
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The challenges faced by incumbents following redistricting have been observed in an
article by Ansolabehere and Snyder. When discussing the effects of redistricting, Ansolabehere
and Snyder suggest that “Changes in district boundaries hurt incumbents since they lose voters
whom they had served and gain voters who don’t know them. There is, in fact, a large difference
between the votes that incumbents win among familiar and new parts of their districts” 51The
authors go on to talk about the effects of change in partisanship being a major issue for
incumbents as well, and the idea of the incumbency effect being diminished significantly by
redistricting.52 So, what seems to be a secure district for Scott Garrett may not be that way.
Garrett needs to, in order to continue his political dominance over the fifth, create a new base
within the new parts of his district, while retaining his old base that remains. This could amount
to a problem for Garrett, as his conservative views will be difficult to pass onto a new
Democratic faction. So, it seems that the fifth, when speaking of Democrats, had to become a
district in which was looked at very closely, to see how Garrett would do in regards to creating a
new base in his new district, and if he could retain his original base. Any sort of slip up, bad
votes, or bad media, could cause this new district to turn on him, since there was no more
guaranteed Republican majority. Garrett needed to tread lightly, and be very cautious of making
moves that would disrupt the Democratic part of his district, if he wanted to remain in office.
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When Scott Garrett went into office, he was known to be a conservative. While New
Jersey could be considered more of a moderate state, Garrett was completely far right, especially
on social issues. Garrett puts very little effort into supporting the rights of women, and the rights
of the LGBTQ community, via the way he votes on these issues in Congress. While in 2013,
Garrett votes “no” on an amendment that would have removed protections for Native Americans
and members of the LGBTQ community, he later votes against an amendment that would
prevent independent contractors from discriminating against those in the LGBTQ community.
Garrett is also a staunch pro-life supporter, receiving a 100% grade from the NRLC, or the
Nation Right to Life Committee, showing that his stances on abortion are very conservative. To
go along with this, he received a 0% grade from NARAL, a pro-choice group that rates
politicians on their stances on abortion, such as the NRLC.53 In July 2006, Scott Garrett voted
yes on a bill that was written to define a marriage as strictly between a man and woman, and
previously voted to ban same sex marriage in 2004. Garrett was given a 0% grade by the HRC,
indicating an anti-gay rights stance, and a 19% score by the NAACP, primarily showing
Garrett’s anti-affirmative action stances. Later, in 2013, Garrett voted on a bill that protected
anti-gay speech as free speech.54 While these are very conservative views, especially for a
representative in the North East, Garrett’s district returned him time and time again suggesting
that this did not affect his status as representative. His voting record seems to stay very
conservative throughout, and consistently he wins elections. Regardless of whether this is
because he has such a strong base within his district, or because of the power in Congress that he
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established and the big money that was available to him as a result, Democrats realized that they
would be wasting their time trying to defeat him, and that there needed to be something
negatively said or done that really enraged the district. In line with Fenno’s discussions, as long
as Garrett is in good standing with the district socially, and his public image does not get
completely out of control, he should be in line for a long career. Fenno discusses things that
could ruin a good relationship with a constituency, such as a string of bad votes in the district
that cannot be explained, or having outlandish statements that your district just does not agree
with whatsoever.
In 2014, Democrat Roy Cho, who is completely self-funded, and not supported by the
Democratic party in any way, gives Garrett a pretty good challenge.55 Clearly, there is a
Democratic base within the district that is forming after the shift of Democratic voters to the
fifth, but since the party has not put any effort into trying to oust him, it is hard for Garrett to
lose. As long as Garrett can stay in good standing with most of his voters, he should still be in
good shape. However, prior to the 2016 election, Garrett does a pretty good job hurting his own
public image. According to an article from NPR, from October 29, 2016, Garrett’s anti-LGBTQ
rights stance may have cost him the 2016 election. In the article, titled Anti-Gay Remarks Lost A
Congressman Wall Street, And Maybe His House Seat, author Joel Rose goes into detail on how
his conservative views on issues such as abortion and gay rights may in fact cost him his seat in
Congress. In 2015, Garrett, in a closed door meeting with the National Republican Congressional
Committee, stated that he would be withholding his dues, until the party no longer supported

55

“UPSET ALERT: Roy Cho ‘within Striking Distance’ of Smug Tea Party Favorite Scott Garrett | Blue Jersey.”
http://www.bluejersey.com/2014/10/upset-alert-roy-cho-within-striking-distance-of-smug-tea-party-favoritescott-garrett/.

38

Republican candidates who were within the LGBTQ community.56 When these comments ended
up leaking to the press, Garrett was flustered, and forced into damage control. The problem with
these comments is that while Garrett may represent these values, the Wall Street organizations
that Garrett had been receiving the financial support that made him such a strong incumbent
from may not. In 2016, businesses naturally would want to stray away from comments such as
those Garrett made, since social media spreads news such as this like wildfire. The last thing
Goldman Sachs wants is a massive social movement against their company online, over their
support of a candidate who represents anti-gay rights policy. So, major campaign contributors
within the financial world, such as Goldman, Capital One, and large Japanese firm Nomura, all
pulled their campaign donations from Garrett.57 Where Garrett was receiving about $600,000 on
average from large financial firms, he now watched that number cut itself in half.58

Scott Garrett seems to do a poor job of understanding the shift in his district after the
redistricting. While Garrett still remains in office, and wins in 2012 and 2014, there seemed to be
some weaknesses exposed. Just using the example of Garrett’s stance on LGBTQ rights, it seems
that the country, let alone his district, are moving in a more progressive direction, while Garrett
seemed to stay stagnant. Garrett clearly was operating on the basis that even if he was to lose
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favorability in his district over certain viewpoints, he was still in a position of power where his
donors could bail him out, and continue to fend off any challenger he faced. However, a mistake
of the magnitude Scott Garrett made does not only put him at risk of ruining his developed
relationship with his district, but it projected nationally that he was out of touch.
In 2016, gay rights was in fact a large issue within politics, and it still is today. In a study
done by the Washington Post, 47% of the nation was pro-gay marriage when Garrett came into
office in 2004, and while that was a low number, considering the progression in LGBTQ rights
in the past 10 years alone, the idea of gay marriage was just beginning to gain traction in the mid
2000’s However when Garrett made these anti-LGBTQ comments, the country was vastly progay marriage, with 71% in favor. 59So, while Garrett stood his ground throughout his career,
especially on social issues such as this, the nation did not agree, and would consider Garrett out
of touch, since he was not willing to become more accepting, such as most of the nation had.
Votes and comments such as these seem to have given Garrett a new reputation of someone who
no longer represented the fifth the way they wanted to be represented. With a rise in Democratic
voter ship in the district, and the decrease in Republican turnout, Garrett had proved his approach
to his district may have been outdated. These trends, which don’t work in Garrett’s favor, along
with a loss of large donations from previously loyal donors, allowed the Democrats to pursue
Scott Garrett’s seat in 2016.
III: Response by Democrats
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This idea of Dual Constituency works well, as long as there is not much that is done in
Congress, or said publicly, that changes the district’s opinion on him or her. As Mayhew says,
one or two bad votes, or bad statements can be explained, but once they consistently add up, and
begin to compile on one another, it is easy for a incumbent to lose a district. This seems to be
what happened when Garrett is finally challenged by a well-backed incumbent. After Garrett’s
anti-gay comments were made public, the DCCC, or the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee, began to target Garrett’s seat in the fifth as an opportunity to take over a red seat. An
article from NJ.com, called, Will voters remember N.J. Rep. Scott Garrett’s gay comments next
fall? quotes Jeb Fain, a spokesperson from the DCCC, who refers to Garrett as “one of the most
extreme and hateful members'' Fain later goes on to comment on the DCCC commitment to
going after Garrett’s seat: "Without a doubt, Congressman Garrett is a top target for us in
2016,"60 The DCCC later produced a 1,111 page document on Garrett, highlighting many
different topics, all deriving from his political career and past. The topic lists span from veterans
affairs, to abortion, all putting a negative spin on how Garrett has spent his time in office
representing the fifth. For example, the report seems to question Garrett’s trustworthiness and
caring about individuals in the district, when stating that he never has held a town hall meeting.
61

This is important when speaking to the district’s trust in Garrett. Fenno talks about the most

important aspect of a representative’s cycle in Congress being obtaining the constituency’s trust.
The fact that Garrett did not hold a town hall meeting for most of his tenure in office, could mean
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“Will Voters Remember N.J. Rep. Scott Garrett’s Gay Comments next Fall? - Nj.Com.”
https://www.nj.com/politics/2015/08/will_voters_remember_nj_rep_scott_garretts_comments_next_fall.html.
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“Scott Garrett (NJ-05) Research Report.” Pg. 6-7.. https://dccc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/160428-ScottGarrett-NJ-05-Research-Book-ONLI-NE.pdf.

41

either that he was extremely confident in his standing with his district such that he did not feel
the need to hold these meetings or that he believed that he could win despite any political
damage not holding might bring.
What the DCCC report seems to find is that Scott Garrett has been completely out of
touch with his district,62 and while his victories may say otherwise, the downward trends that
show us a loss in Republican turnout, and a rise in Democratic registration and turnout, may
show us that not only is his base abandoning him, but he struggled to establish a base in the new
part of the district, which came to be after the redistricting of 2012. This is crucial to Garrett’s
incumbency, as once he was shown to be relatively vulnerable by Roy Cho in 2014, the
Democrats went all in. What made matters worse for Garrett was the comment that he made,
which brought Garrett into national attention. With the DCCC and other Democratic groups
looking to target Garrett, this made for a great time for a well-funded Democrat to come in and
try to take Garrett’s seat from him. That is what Josh Gottheimer looked to do in 2016, and
succeeded in doing so. His campaign went after Garrett, appealing to Democrats who really
hadn’t had a voice in the district for quite some time, since Garrett took strong control of the
district back in 2006 and 2008. The comments made led to digging into voting records that
brought up facts supportive of framing Scott Garrett as not being in support of a women’s right
to choice, even when she is raped63. Votes such as these were used by the Democrats to pin
Garrett as a Tea Party conservative in a district that was no longer in line with those ideals.
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While in 2004, the idea of LGBTQ rights was more of an issue you either supported or you
didn’t, that was not the case in 2015 when Garrett makes his comments.
IV: Conclusion
Overall, Scott Garrett rises to power pretty much exactly how you would want to, if you
were a Congressional candidate. He originally wins his district, and weathers two tough election
years to be a Republican representative, giving him power as the incumbent, positioning him to
fight off Democrats seeking election in the fifth. He is loyal to his party, which rewards him with
the privilege of being a member of a committee that oversees big money, enabling him to garner
more campaign money from large corporate interests. Garrett looks to be in line for a long career
in office, until the redistricting of the fifth. The Republicans voted to make the fifth more
competitive, seemingly to win over other seats in the immediate future, believing that Garrett
was a powerful incumbent who was not challenged in 2010 and looked secure in 2012.
Nevertheless, this may not have been a problem for Garrett if he had not lost touch with his
district, or if he won over his new constituency before it was too late. However, after continuing
to stay loyal to his conservative values, even when the district had demographically changed, and
the nation had changed their outlook on many issues, Garrett weakened himself unnecessarily
with negative comments regarding LGBTQ rights and lost support in both his donor constituency
and in the district’s electorate. Garrett could have coasted to a long career in office, if he was not
so stubborn on issues that clearly did not match that of his district. While party loyalty seemed to
be important to him, what more power was there to gain? He was moving up as an experienced
member of the Financial Services Committee and was even a chairman on a Subcommittee in
charge of regulating big money. Garrett could have tweaked his ideology, in order to gain the
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support of his new district, but he stuck to his guns, and it may have cost him his career as a
Congressman.
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYTICAL STUDY
Looking back, it seems that after a great rise to power, Scott Garrett, and those around
him, seem to fall victim to his own success. The redistricting of the fifth seems to be the
beginning of Garrett’s downfall. This movement brought a large number of new Democrats to
the district, for what seems to be because of the fact that Garrett seems to have a strong hold of
the district after two victories in down years for Republicans. After this, Garrett seems to fail to
capitalize on this new demographic, and also is seeming to lose his base. With the changing
demographic, and Scott Garrett sticking to his conservative values, it makes sense why numbers
that seem to support Garrett go down within the district. The final nail in the coffin, so to speak,
is Garrett making harsh statements regarding LGBTQ rights, where he finds big money donors
pull out on him, and Democrat Josh Gottheimer taking advantage of Garrett’s comments, along
with his voting history, to oust him of his seat. To try and justify this argument, I will be looking
at multiple trends that seem to back the claims I am making. First, I will look at what I consider
to be the beginning of Garrett’s downfall, the redistricting of the fifth in 2012, speaking on how
Garrett does not capitalize on the opportunity to build a new base in the new demographic added
to the district. I will then move on to look at the district as a whole, looking for any trends that
prove that Garrett is losing his base, and district as a whole. I will then move onto looking more
specifically at Bergen county, and looking even closer, to the ward level, to see if the trends
found at the district level match that of ward level. After this, I will look at how campaign
finance plays into these trends, and look to see if there are any correlations with that of voter
turnout and registration by party, looking once again at district level as a whole, and then ward
level. To close, I will try to explain how the following data and trends all work together to
seemingly back up the hypothesis stated previously in this project.
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I: Redistricting of the Fifth
The moment where Scott Garrett’s incumbency began to weaken seems to be the 2010
census redistricting of 2012. This census took away a solid chunk of Warren County from the
district, and added a large portion of Bergen County to the Fifth.64 In total, the Fifth added 96
districts from Bergen while losing only 18, and losing around 10-15,000 voters from Warren
County.65 What can only seem to be a direct correlation to the sudden rise in Democratic
registration, Bergen County had become even more important to the structure of the Fifth. This
is important, as Garrett needs to now move into this district, and attempt to establish a
relationship with this new base. With such a high number of Democrats moving into the district,
this would be a challenge for Garrett, that according to the following figures, he seems to fail.
FIGURE A)
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“GOP Wins N.J. Congressional Redistricting Battle - Nj.Com.”.
https://www.nj.com/news/2011/12/redistricting_commission_makes.html.
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“NJ DOS - Division of Elections - 2012 Election Results.” https://www.njelections.org/election-information2012.shtml#general.
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FIGURE B)
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“BERGEN COUNTY Statement of Vote GENERAL ELECTION 2012.” 2012.
http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/_Content/pdf/elections/o/2012-General-Election.pdf.
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FIGURE C)
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“BERGEN COUNTY Statement of Vote GENERAL ELECTION 2014.” 2014.
http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/_Content/pdf/elections/o/2014-General-Election.pdf.
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In figures A-C, the districts that were added into the Fifth after the 2012 redistricting of
the Fifth are looked at in terms of who they voted for, from 2012 to 2016. Clearly, there is a
strong Democratic presence within these districts and towns, as the ratio of Democratic votes
compared to Republican votes is quite high. For example, out of all the votes cast in the newly
added districts in 2012, Garrett accumulated 17,951 votes compared to his opponents 36,414. In
2014 Garrett lost these districts by about 8,000 votes, Garrett with 12,432, and his opponent with
20,930. Finally, in 2016, when defeated by Gottheimer, Garrett accumulated a total of 16,748
votes compared to Gottheimer 39,675 votes in the area added in the 2012 redistricting. In 2016, I
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“BERGEN COUNTY Statement of Vote GENERAL ELECTION 2016.” 2016.
http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/_Content/pdf/elections/o/2016-General-Election.pdf.
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The bars that are labeled with town names are all the combined votes from all the individual districts added to the
fifth within the individual towns. Ramsey 7-8 and Wycoff 9-10 are districts added to a town who has previously
been in the fifth, which is why the total vote numbers are so low compared to the other towns.
70 In 2016 the information for these individual districts was not available, as total vote count was only available at
the town level for Bergen County.
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was unable to access voter data for specific wards within towns, so the data for New Milford 9,
Ramsey 7-8 and Wycoff 9-10 were no available for 2016. Since these wards are a small part of
the total numbers provided, and they seem to fall in line with the rest of the town in regards of
voting for Garrett consistently, it seems to not affect this specific table as a whole. This data
seems to account for the sudden rise in voter registration for Democrats in the District, and can
also explain why Republican registration seems to stay stagnant, between the addition of these
districts and the loss of about 10-15,000 votes from Warren county, the district seems to have
become evenly matched, where it previously favored Republicans. The massive margin of
victory for Democrats in these districts could seemingly close a previous gap that the
Republicans had been taking advantage of. However, while all of this seems to explain why there
is a higher Democratic presence in the district, with the new Democratic base post-2012
redistricting, the question that needs to be answered is that of the Republican presence in the
district, and what is going on with Republican turnout? At the end of the day, what has built
Scott Garrett to be a strong incumbent was the strong presence of Republican vote, so what
changes? Along with this, why is there such a drastic change heading from 2014 to 2016, but not
2010 to 2012, when the redistricting occurred?

II: District Outlook
While the redistricting of the fifth seems to be the supposed start of the negative trends
that lead to Garrett’s collapse, it would be good to take a look at the fifth more generally. When
looking for answers regarding changes in the fifth, you must begin the conversation with Bergen
County. Bergen County, by population, is the majority of the district, and with the redistricting
of the fifth, the county became even more of a majority of the district. For example, in 2016, out
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of a total of 337,701 ballots cast, 237,540 came from within Bergen County. The following
figure shows total votes, by party, for each of the counties within the fifth, from 2006-2016.
FIGURE D)
CONGRESSIONAL VOTE IN NEW JERSEY”S 5th CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT,
BY PARTY (2006-2016)71

Bergen

Democrat

Republican

Third Party

2006

62,944

67,287

909

2008

87,120

98,048

2,285

2010

43,846

76,419

1,560

2012

102,491

110,353

4,051

2014

66,771

71,318

1,133

2016

135,681

101,859

3,985

2006

6,273

8,731

210

2008

10,409

14,439

303

2010

5,079

10,136

265

2012

5,921

10,026

321

2014

3,233

6,387

179

2016

7,449

9,962

387

Passaic
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“NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Election Results Archive.” https://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/electioninformation-results.shtml.
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Sussex
2006

9,995

19,094

863

2008

16,371

32,487

1,785

2010

6,492

20,876

1,482

2012

12,781

28,984

1,832

2014

7,128

16,310

642

2016

17,880

28,117

2,173

2006

10,291

17,030

615

2008

17,133

27,679

948

2010

7,217

16,599

1,022

2012

8,909

18,140

566

2014

4,676

10,663

481

2016

11,577

17,752

879

Warren

Prior to the 2016 election, and even more so prior to the redistricting of the fifth, Garrett
tends to benefit from a large margin of victory in what could be considered his main base, or
group of voters who will always vote for a candidate, within Warren and Sussex counties. For
example, in 2008, when Garrett ran against Democrat Dennis Schulman, Garrett won the election
by about 40,000 votes. In Bergen county, Garrett only won by about 11,000 votes out of almost
200,000. This is a relatively normal victory in Bergen for Garrett, who would tend to win Bergen
by a relatively small margin, leaving the door open, so to speak, for an opponent to win the
election in the smaller counties. The benefit of having a strong base in Warren and Sussex, and
winning these counties by such a large margin, is that it not only ensures victory for Garrett, but
pushes the margin of victory into a position where the victory is comfortable, and Garrett won’t
look as a weaker incumbent.
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What is important about this is that the larger the margin of victory, the stronger the
incumbent looks, and less highly qualified challengers will try to come and take the seat from
Garrett. In 2008, Garrett won Warren with 27,697 votes, compared to Schulman’s 17,133, and he
won Sussex with 32,487 votes compared to Shulman’s 16,371, which adds up to a total victory
margin of 26,680 votes between the two counties. Garrett only won this election by a total of
41,620 votes. The base that Garrett has formed in Warren and Sussex gives him the security he
needs to win elections easily. If the tables turned on him in Warren and Sussex, Garrett would
have either lost the election outright, or the election would have made him look like a
significantly weaker incumbent who the Democratic Party would have looked to target. Even a
10,000 vote swing would have significantly hurt him, as it would have left Garrett victorious by
only 20,000 votes, to a candidate who spent significantly less money on their campaign. With
Warren and Sussex giving him a nice cushion to work with, Garrett can comfortably win
elections, rather than have to really work for his votes. Warren and Sussex seem to be where
Garrett earns his respect as an incumbent. Since Bergen is usually so close, Warren and Sussex
pick up the slack, so to speak, for Garrett. This could directly attribute to the laying off of the
Democratic Party in the fifth, which leads to Garrett, and those around him, envisioning him as
an incumbent who cannot be beaten.
This is where the problem of redistricting arises, as not only does the process add more
voting districts in Bergen, but takes away some from Warren, which ends up adding to around
10-15,000 votes per election lost in Warren. This seems to come into play in 2014, as the margin
of victory for Garrett shrinks to 22,870 votes, with Garrett winning the election with 104,678
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votes to that of opponent Roy Cho’s 81,808. 72Cho put a little over 1.2 million dollars into his
campaign, the most any opponent had put into their election since Garrett came into office. The
question then arises, was that a sign of Garrett having a weakness within the district, after the
2012 redistricting, and it clearly beginning to show its head? What Garrett seems to be failing to
do in the district, is capture a new base within the newly added towns and wards in Bergen, and
obviously, after 2012, Roy Cho took notice.
III: The role of Campaign Finance
In 2014, Roy Cho almost won Bergen from Garrett, losing by only about 5,000 votes,
while only spending about half of what Garrett spent, with about 1.25 million compared to
Garrett’s almost 2.3 million.73 What the following figures will show are the amounts of money
spent by Garrett in his reelections, compared to his opponents.
FIGURE E):
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“NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Election Results Archive.” https://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/electioninformation-results.shtml.
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“Rep. Scott Garrett - New Jersey • OpenSecrets.”. https://www.opensecrets.org/members-ofcongress/elections?cid=N00000743&cycle=CAREER.
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What we see here is an attempted by Democrats to defeat Garrett, with Dennis Schulman
raising $1.11 million, and yet being outspent, and defeated. After this, Garrett slides into a
comfortable, stable stage of his incumbency. Democrats clearly refuse to challenge him, as the
total money spent by Garrett’s opponents in 2010 and 2012 comes to a grand total of $71,060.
However, for such a small amount of money spent on his campaign, 2012 opponent Adam
Gussen only lost the election by 37,401 votes, being able to collect a total of 130,102 votes while
spending only $51,440 on his campaign. What this tells us is that after the redistricting of 2012,
Democrats, for how little money was being put into elections, had a pulse in the district, and
were just waiting for well-backed candidate to run for the seat.
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Along with this, voter turnout in Warren and Sussex counties, where Garrett seemed to
win by such large margins, was decreasing at a rapid rate. Where voter turnout was 48% in
Warren and 49% in Sussex, it dwindled to 35% in Warren and 36% in Sussex in 2014. Garrett
still won those counties, and by a solid percentage, as he won Warren by 5,506 votes, and Sussex
by 8,540 votes. This ended up being enough to push Garrett over once again, however, this drop
in voter turnout had to be a cause for concern for Garrett, as while voter turnout was also down
in Bergen, being at 44% in 2014, it was still a higher turnout than Sussex and Warren, with way
more votes to be had.
FIGURE F:

75

FIGURE G:

75

“NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Summary of Registered Voters and Ballots Cast.”
https://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/election-information-ballots-cast.shtml.
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The two figures above show the turnout percentages in each election of Garrett’s
incumbency, by county. As seen in Figure F above, voter turnout, runs on a strange trend. It
seems that it generally increases, is when Garrett is defeated by Gottheimer in 2016, which could
suggest a rise in Democratic turnout along with a well-backed Democrat. Warren County, which
has been where Garrett had the most success throughout his incumbency, was the only county in
the district to continue to drop in turnout heading into 2016. What this could possibly suggest, is
that Garrett is losing his base, due to a loss of his base over the years, while Democratic turnout
could be rising, due to the rise of a well-backed candidate. It seems, that these trends show us
that Garrett is doing a poor job getting people out to vote. Considering the highest turnout rates
during his time in office came during his first two reelections, and after there is a steady decline,
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“NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Summary of Registered Voters and Ballots Cast.”
https://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/election-information-ballots-cast.shtml.

57

until he loses office, there is definitely ground to say that Garrett could have slowly lost his base,
and his district. A better way to look deeper into this is to see if this trend carries over to party
turnout and registration, at the local level. If there is a consistent decline in both these numbers,
for Republicans, and a rise for Democrats, Scott Garrett very well could have lost his base.
Whether because of rash comments he made, consistent conservative votes in a district becoming
more and more progressive, or just out of believing he was a sure victor every time he ran, it
doesn’t matter. People stop showing up.
IV: Turnout Trends at Ward Level:
Bergen County takes up the vast majority of the votes within the district, I decided to get
a closer look at voter turnout at the town and ward level. While there is a clear base within
Warren, Sussex, and at times, Passaic counties, it is important to see whether there are parts of
Bergen that show up and vote for Garrett during his run as Congressman.

FIGURE H:
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What Figure I shows is a closer look at individual wards within towns across Bergen
County, in midterm election years. In order for this to be as accurate and fair a study of Bergen
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“BERGEN COUNTY CLERK Prior Election Results archives” http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/Services/24
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County as possible, I chose twenty wards at random from a list of wards within the county, using
an application that is designed to randomly pick from a list that is plugged into the application. In
order for this study to help show how the Fifth was turning out, I made sure to only include
districts that were not affected by the redistricting of the Fifth. When one ward was picked, it
was removed from the list, and then I would continue, in order to avoid repeated picks. What is
important here is that in most midterm election years, the primary elections are more than likely
in the House of Representatives, which means in the Fifth, Scott Garrett is the lead man. These
statistics could be seen as alarming for Garrett, as turnout from 2006, all the way to 2014, shows
a massive dip in turnout, throughout the county. This ends up being the election in which Garrett
wins by the slimmest margin of votes during his incumbency, and it seems that it can be
correlated with the lack of voter turnout
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On the other hand, what Figure J shows, is the difference in turnout in these same Wards,
in Presidential election years. Here is what is alarming for Scott Garrett, there isn’t much of a
difference between turnouts over this 8 year span, which contains three Presidential elections. If
you compare the two, the turnout rate going down in midterm years and not Presidential years
can mean a couple things. Either a) The district, and Garrett’s base of voters believe that he is a
sure victory, and no longer are turning up to vote, or what seems to be more likely b) Garrett is
losing popularity with his district, and his base is losing numbers from when he was seemingly in
his prime, in 2006. What seems to be the best way to prove whether either of these theories are
correct, is to give a deeper look at voter registration by party, to see whether or not there is a
correlation between voter turnout and registration.
V: The Voter Registration Dilemma
When looking at if an elected official’s base is coming out to vote for him or her, you
must start at the beginning of the voting process, voter registration. Registering to vote is a
simple thing to do, and is something politicians want voters from their party, not the opposing
party, to do. From the data that the New Jersey Division of Elections provides, voter registration
rises within the Fifth from 432,335 registered voters across the district in 2010, to a grand total
of 511,123 in 2016. 79
FIGURE J:
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“BERGEN COUNTY CLERK Prior Election Results archives” http://www.bergencountyclerk.org/Services/24
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“NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Statewide Voter Registration Statistics Archive.”.
https://www.njelections.org/election-information-svrs.shtml.
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When looking at registration by party, it seems that over the course of these six years, Democrats
are beginning to mobilize in the district are a far more rapid rate than that of their Republican
counterparts. While by the 2016 election, Republican registration and Democratic registration
are practically neck and neck, the rate of growth in registration in the prior six years leading up
to this is not even close. What is interesting about this upward trend of Democratic presence is
that while the registration numbers spike from 2010-2012 and 2014-2016, the Democratic
registration does not change much from 2012-2014. This is consistent with Republican and
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“NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Statewide Voter Registration Statistics Archive.”
https://www.njelections.org/election-information-svrs.shtml.
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Unaffiliated registration as well, which suggests party polarization during presidential election
years may be a large factor, and with the large number of Democrats moving to the district in
2010, it makes sense why there would be an uptick. The large rise in unaffiliated voters
registering in 2010-2012 also can be attributed to the new wave of voters coming to the district,
but the dip in registration in 2014-2016, along with the rise in Democratic and Republican
registration may also suggest party polarization in presidential years. In total, Democrats are
mobilizing more rapidly in the district post-2010 census, with an additional 44,472 registered
Democratic voters in 2016 from 2010, the Democrats registration increased by 45.31% in the
district, while with only 13,506 additional registered Republicans, the parties registration only
increased by 10.27%.81 What is key to this individual case is that the gap of registered voters,
which was once significantly wide with Republicans outnumbering Democrats by over 30,000
voters, has been closed to within a couple thousand voters. This shows the massive change in the
district, in terms of party politics, after the 2010 census. It also shows that Garrett seems to not
capitalize on this new area, as more registered Democrats means more than likely that those
voters are not interested in voting for Garrett. Stemming off previous Figures I and J, this shows
this percentage of increase from both Democrats and Republicans also points to a dip in
Republican turnout for Garrett. With consistent rises in Democratic registration, along with dips
in turnout in midterm elections, where Garrett is more than likely the focal point of the election,
seems to continue to promote the idea that Garrett fell out of touch, and his voters are responding
accordingly. However, this is still not enough correlating evidence to say with confidence that
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“NJ DOS - Division of Elections - Statewide Voter Registration Statistics Archive.”
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the claim that Scott Garrett lost his base is valid. What must be done next, is look at ward level
registration, such as was done previously with ward level turnout, in order to see if this issue of
registration is similar at the local level.
VI: Ward Level Registration:
In order to get the best understanding of whether or not the issue of registration is a sign
that redistricting is the main issue in the fifth, or if there is a combination of added Democrats
via redistricting, and a loss of Garrett’s base, we must look at registration at the local level, in
order to compare it to turnout and total votes in the area.
FIGURES K-N)
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Figures K-N show the trend of voter registration, within the districts inside Bergen County that
were previously looked at in Section IV. What is significant about these graphs is that there
really isn’t a drastic change. According to the graphs on turnout in these districts, where turnout
is shrinking quickly, you would expect these graphs to be going downwards in trend themselves,
yet, ever so slightly, the opposite is happening for the most part. The only ward with significant
change is Wycoff 1, which could potentially be attributed to the redistricting of the district,
which added two more wards to Wycoff, potentially spreading out the voters in the town. So,
what does this mean? After analyzing previous Figures that show that not only is turnout
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shrinking, while registration seems to be rising slightly, it seems that Republicans are just not
showing up anymore. Democrats are starting to take hold of the district once again. The best way
to prove this, is to look at total results in the district, and compare to the turnout and registration
rates.
VII: Voting Results
To see if the dip in turnout compared to a slight rise in registration can lead to a conclusion that
Garrett has lost his base, and failed to gain a new base in new areas added to the district after
redistricting, We must look at vote totals for Garrett, and see if they correlate with lack of
turnout in midterm years, along with Presidential years, where turnout doesn’t change much.

FIGURE O)

FIGURE P)
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What these trends show us is that Garrett is losing votes. The only positive spike for
Garrett is the Midterms from 2006-10, but that is when Garrett has his greatest margin of victory,
and right before the districts were realigned, making the Fifth significantly more competitive. In
Presidential years, where turnout in the district, along with voter registration are moving up,
Garrett is still on a negative slope, suggesting that in fact, Republicans are either showing up less
for Garrett, compared to their Democratic counterparts, or just not voting for Garrett when they
do show up. To see if this is true, we must look at this at ward level, to see if these trends match
with the wards in Bergen County we have looked at previously.

FIGURES Q-X)
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What Figures Q-X are showing, when looking at the local level, is that while Garrett is
losing votes, Democrats are gaining votes. On a consistent level throughout the previous charts,
Scott Garrett is losing votes from 2010-2014, looking at midterm vote totals, along with from
2012-2016 with Presidential. Not only does this trend exist in practically every single Ward
looked at in these graphs, it completely goes along with the other trends in these districts, such as
dips in turnout but rises in registration. While obviously there is a sharper spike in Democratic
vote from 2012-2016 than 2010-2014, we must look back at the money being put into this
election. To put it in perspective, Garrett really only about doubles his previous spending high,
while Gottheimer quadruples the previous spending high by a Democrat, which seems to help
make money a large factor is this as well. This is a possible explanation for what is going on in
the district, and supports the claim that Garrett is losing his voters. Since turnout, and votes for
Garrett are falling, and registration, especially Democratic registration, along with votes for
Democratic opponents are rising, it could be said that Garrett is losing his grasp on the district,
and his base is no longer showing up for him. As has been said before, 2010 is not only the year
where the least money is spent by a Democratic opponent, but is also the last year before the
redistricting of the fifth. After the redistricting, trends began to move in Democrat’s favor, with
rises in Democratic registration, and potentially turnout, based on what is shown here, it could be
safe to say that Democrat’s saw a weakened seat in the fifth. The most drastic change in most of
these wards is that of Democratic vote from 2012-2016 in the Presidential year chart, along with
2010-2014 in the Midterm year chart. What is significant about these elections is that, starting
with 2014, Democrats began putting money into elections again. While Roy Cho’s financial
contributions nowhere near match that of Gottheimer in 2016, the relatively sizable rise in vote

79

share for Cho in 2014, compared to previous midterm elections, along with Garrett’s slight drop
in numbers, exposes a weakness that Garrett clearly does not account for. This weakness,
through a mobilization of Democrats, seems to become amplified in 2016, after rash statements
by Garrett seem to inspire Democrats to push to reacquire the seat in the fifth. Clearly, what all
that was needed to mobilize the new Democrats in this district was money. As while the trends of
voter registration and turnout show that Garrett may be losing favorability in the district, once
large sums of campaign money are inserted into the equation, drastic change happens.
VIII: Conclusion:
What all the data put forth in this analytical study has shown for myself is that there
seems to be a combination of issues in the fifth when speaking of how Garrett loses in 2016. It
does not seem to be just a simple explanation, where one single factor is the main reason why,
but rather a series of events that compiled to end up losing Garrett the district. It starts with the
redistricting after the 2010 census, which weakens the strong Republican majority in the district,
with a new rise in Democrats. After this, Garrett seems to be consistently losing his base,
whether from not being as committed to his constituency as he once was, to making bad votes in
Congress, while trying to gain power in DC. While this is going on, Democratic presence
continues to rise, along with Democratic vote, and these trends must have caught the eye of
Democrats. After Garrett proves he cannot win over this new demographic, the money spent in
elections begins to become a factor again, with Roy Cho potentially showing some weakness in
Garrett’s district. The final blow seems to be Josh Gottheimer throwing out massive sums of
money, compared to Democrats before him. This ends up working, as Gottheimer succeeds in
the mobilization of Democrats in the fifth, while Garrett cannot reciprocate with Republicans.
Scott Garrett was unable to not only capitalize on a new demographic moving to his district, also
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seems to lose his voter base, especially after Garrett makes crude comments on LGBTQ rights,
and makes certain “bad votes” that make his district angry. After the 2010 census, New Jersey’s
fifth congressional district was slowly moving towards Democratic representation, that Josh
Gottheimer took advantage of after six years’ worth of negative trends for Republicans, and
positive trends for Democrats. By throwing large sums of money into his 2016 election, Josh
Gottheimer, and his donors succeed in mobilizing Democrats against a representative that these
members of the district no longer believe represents them.
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CONCLUSION
To conclude, finding where Scott Garrett falters is not an easy task. As stated previously,
Garrett is very successful in building his congressional career. As discussed in the literature
review, the four main requirements for congressional success are 1) developing a base, which
after multiple wins within a district an incumbent moves onto 2) power in Congress, where party
loyalty, is rewarded. While this is a risky game this allows for appointment to committee. What
is important, especially when voting along party lines is 3) maintaining a good public image,
where a Congressman or woman can explain why they voted a certain way. While after
developing power in Congress, Congressmen or women find themselves acquiring substantial 4)
acquiring substantial and consistent campaign funding. With power in Congress, a vote from a
representative becomes subject to greater scrutiny, and outside groups will look to keep that
person in office, or remove them. Garrett seems to execute this plan to a tee in his first six to
eight years in Congress, establishing a strong base, which deters highly qualified candidates from
running against Garrett. With no strong Democratic challenger in sight, Garrett has a
comfortable hold on his district. Garrett then moves to developing power in Congress, and
through his loyalty to the party, is rewarded with a seat on the Financial Services committee, and
later a lead position on a subcommittee. Since Garrett’s committee deals directly with big
money, Garrett becomes backed well by Wall Street. With a comfortable situation at home, and
substantial financial backing from outside sources, Garrett has developed a strong Dual
Constituency, as Mayhew describes. Garrett remains viewed well by his district up, as his margin
of victory continues to grow, and it looks like Garrett is in line for a long term career.
Certain factors seem to lead to Garrett’s decline and later his downfall within his district.
Starting with the redistricting of 2012, the Republican Party in New Jersey seems to believe that
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Garrett is untouchable, and there is a shift of Democrats out of the eighth and ninth districts, and
into the fifth. Garrett seems to neglect this new grouping of voters in the district that he needs to
appeal to and that he also needs to continue to work with his base, making sure that it is strong as
ever, considering the rise in Democratic registration after 2012. However, Garrett seems to stick
to his guns, and continues to support conservative legislation and ideas, and it begins to backfire.
After more than a few bad votes in a row, and some outlandish comments made about LGBTQ
rights, along with multiple trends that have not been moving in Garrett’s favor, registration,
turnout, and total vote wise, Roy Cho funds his own campaign, and challenges Garrett. Cho
funding his own campaign, and being the first Democrat to challenge Garrett since the
redistricting of 2012 exposes a grouping of trends, such as the negative trends of republican
registration compared to total votes, compared to that of the drastic rise in Democratic
registration and total votes. What Cho does, is shows the Democratic Party that the Democrats in
the fifth are prepared and ready to mobilize under a well-funded, highly qualified candidates.
This seems to open the door for Josh Gottheimer, who attacks Garrett for his statements, and
votes, and takes advantage of the trends that Garrett seems to have been ignoring, costing him
the seat.
What is there to learn from this conclusion? Primarily, not to become complacent, and
stay in one’s ways, seems to be the best way to adapt and continue thriving in today’s political
climate. Politics is nothing like it was in 2004, let alone 2008, when Garrett became a powerful
incumbent. Social media by itself, seems to have amplified the idea of public image over mostly
everything else in politics. If you can maintain a good social presence in today’s politics, you
will be alright. Where Garrett could have survived is his outlandish comments. Making an antiLGBTQ comment in the year 2015 will mess up one’s public image easily, especially when
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someone is throwing money at commercials trying to turn your district against you. As Mayhew
states, you may have to cross party lines at times, in order to stay on the side of favorability. If
Garrett changed certain aspects of his political agenda to match that of his ever-changing district,
he would probably still be in office today. However, this is not the case, and the stubbornness of
Garrett led to his eventual demise. What New Jersey’s fifth district can teach other incumbents
most is to have a consistent, yet flexible approach to understanding one’s constituency. When
having a “flexible approach” one must be able to adapt to changes within an incumbents district,
and not remaining stagnant regarding the view of one’s constituency. Making sure to not become
power hungry, and neglecting the district, are vital to one’s success.
Overall, Garrett’s rise to success is a textbook example. He does all the things needed,
and stated by scholars in the field, to establish a base, and develop power in Congress. Where
Garrett ends up faltering is after this rise. Garrett ends up not paying as much attention to his
changing district as he should, and this allows for negative trends to develop. In order to avoid
these negative trends, which leads to vulnerability, Garrett needed to appeal to his new district,
not being afraid to change some of his values for the betterment of the district, and the longevity
of his career. With Garrett’s inability to recognize changes in the district, and adjust according,
his district responds, and swiftly removes him when given the chance. This shows incumbents
across the country, even those who believe they are safe, that while they may believe that the
power they have acquired over the course of their careers may help them coast to long
incumbencies, this may not be the case. The case of New Jersey’s fifth in 2016 proves that no
matter who a Congressman is, or how much powerful they are, the people will always have the
final say.
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